摘要
当平台厂商针对一边用户实施搭售时,会对两边用户和平台整体的福利同时产生影响,这明显不同于传统单边市场。本文基于微软搭售案构建理论模型对平台厂商搭售行为的圈定效应、网络效应、多样性损失效应和价格效应四种基本后果进行了研究。社会总体福利水平可能由于交叉网络外部性的作用而增加,也可能由于圈定效应对竞争性产品的排挤而减少。总体上搭售品可能在短期内带来社会福利的非帕雷托改进,但长期内对行业动态竞争和创新会有不利影响,这两方面的作用应当作为评判双边市场中平台厂商搭售行为的重要依据。
Based on the unique characteristics of two-sided markets, the economic effects of tying of platform is different from those in tradition alone-sided markets. The paper focuses on the effects of tying in two-sided markets with a simple the oretical model. The possible effects include market for eclosure, network effect, product diversity loss and price effect. Al- though the network effect could increase social welfare, it would be offset by other effects in more realistic conditions, leading to decreased social welfare. Furthermore, the strength of the platform＇s current market position and the negative impact on the long-term dynamic competition are two additional important factors in evaluating the effects of platform tying in two-sided mar- kets.
出处
《中国经济问题》
CSSCI
北大核心
2017年第5期70-82,共13页
China Economic Studies
基金
教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金项目(15YJA790050)
山东大学经济学院"学术繁荣计划"的资助
关键词
搭售
双边市场
反垄断
微软
tying
two-sided markets
antitrust
Microsoft
