摘要
担保机制是资本市场中的一个重要的增信机制。关联担保是信用机制缺失和信贷市场不发达的背景下内生的,在中国具有普遍性。关联担保是把"双刃剑",可以提高企业融资规模,降低投资不足程度,但也会导致信用过度使用,出现风险失控。日趋严厉的监管政策下,关联担保的经济后果如何?系统研究关联担保与关联方之间的风险转移及其约束机制具有重要的实践意义。本文以2003—2014年中国A股上市公司为样本,研究上市公司对关联方提供的担保额与担保方债务诉讼风险的关系。实证结果表明,上市公司为下属公司或子公司提供的关联担保越高,其面临的诉讼风险越大。进一步的研究发现,在公司治理较好或外部约束较强的环境下,关联担保与诉讼之间的关系较弱,甚至负相关。外部约束机制如地区法制化程度和审计质量、内部治理因素如财务杠杆、投资机会和大股东持股比例都会影响上述关系。研究表明,更完善的约束机制能使关联担保发挥更多的正面效果,降低债务风险,使担保双方实现共赢与发展。
Guarantee mechanism is an important credit mechanism in the capital market. Related-party guarantee is endogenous under the background of the lack of credit mechanism and less developed credit market, and is universal in China. Related-party guarantee is a double-edged sword. It may enhance financing scale of the enterprise and lower underinvestment, but also lead to excessive use of credit and loss of risk control. As the regulation policies become tougher, what are the economic consequences of related-party guarantee？ The systematic research about risk transfer and restraint mechanism between related-party guarantee and related parties has important practical significance. Using the panel data of A-share listed companies in China covering period from 2003 to 2014, we find the influence and consequences of related-party guarantee by studying the relationship between the guarantee to related parties provided by the listed company and the debt secured party litigation risk, the result shows that more guarantees for the subsidiary company or subsidiary associated, the listed company will face the higher joint and several liability and litigation risk. Further research shows that the relationship between the related-party guarantee and joint and several liability litigation poses weaker in the environment of better corporate governance or tighter external constraints. External constraint factors such as regional legal degree and auditors, internal governance factors such as financial leverage, the investment opportunities and the nature of property rights, will affect the relationship. As a result, the related-party guarantee will play a more positive effect under a better constraint mechanism, reducing the possibility of debt risk transfer, and making both sides of guarantee realize win-win and well developed.
出处
《中国工业经济》
CSSCI
北大核心
2017年第8期120-137,共18页
China Industrial Economics
基金
国家自然科学基金面上项目"选择性执法--基于债务诉讼的经验证据"(批准号71572210)
关键词
关联担保
诉讼风险
约束机制
related part guarantee
litigation risk
constraint mechanism
