摘要
本文基于某电力公司的实地调研,在运作能力因灾受损情境下研究了应急修复过程中管理者两种过度自信行为对决策偏差的影响,分析了惩罚援助机制在决策纠偏方面的作用。研究结果表明:提高惩罚和积极援助的"胡萝卜+大棒"调控机制有助于纠正管理者过度自信造成的决策偏差;过度精确行为对偏差存在双向影响,但可通过调节惩罚援助参数比例促使管理者向"积极应急"的方向决策;过高估计行为必将造成应急投入不足,同时将抑制过度精确行为的偏差,惩罚援助的调控机制必然失效;外界随机扰动分布左偏时,管理者需适当增加决策量以缓解应急投入不足。
Overconfidence behavior stems from the confidence of manager based on his prior knowledge, which could be strengthened by learning, training or successful experience. Some theoretical and experimental studies suggest that overconfidence could help a manager improve his decision-making performance in the scenario of having incomplete or uncertain information. However, this is not always the case, especially in the scenario of unexpected events with extremely low probability, such as fire, earthquake, and terrorist attacks. Decision bias caused by overconfidence behavior could weaken or even invalidate a manager＇s performance, because the kind of human behavior might make manager lose his capability of knowledge calibration when he observes the inconsistencies with his prior knowledge. Some cases, such as the Blackout in USA and Canada（2003）, and Fukushima nuclear leak in Japan（2011）, verify that a manager＇s overconfidence plays a seriously negative role during the disruption events, which is also revealed by our survey of a power company＇s senior and middle managers. The impact of a manager＇s overconfidence towards the disruption management＇ performance is seldom studied in the field of disruption management. Moreover, researching a mathematical model that includes different kinds of overconfidence is even less in the voluminous operational researches. This paper examines the disruptive situation of large-scale operation systems, such as power station, chemical plant and communication systems, when their critical capabilities are crippled by unexpected events. The goal is to understand how decision bias causes a manager＇s overconfidence, and further analyze the impact of this kind of behavior towards regulatory penalty and subsidy mechanism. In section 2, we firstly construct a mathematical model when manager is assumed to be completely rational. This model is called Model I. This model includes all kinds of cost that could be met in the period of disruption management, and it is proved to be a
作者
包兴
BAO Xing(Party School of Zhejiang Provincial Committee of C. P. C, Hangzhou 311121, china Zhejiang Scientific Development Research Center, Hangzhou 311121, china)
出处
《管理工程学报》
CSSCI
CSCD
北大核心
2017年第3期37-44,共8页
Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71302033
71301146)
教育部博士点基金资助项目(2011332612002)
浙江省自然科学基金资助项目(LQ12G01004)
浙江省社科规划"之江青年课题研究成果"资助项目(13ZJQN048YB)
关键词
过度自信
应急运作
决策偏差
惩罚和援助
有偏随机扰动
Overconfidence
Disruption management
Decision bias
Penalty and subsidy
Skewed random disturbance
