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双寡头团购商家的定价决策研究 被引量:1

Study on pricing decision for duopoly group-buying merchants
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摘要 现有的团购定价的研究基本上考虑的是单一团购商家的情形,通常忽视团购的广告效应对定价决策的影响.文章在固定价格机制下研究双寡头竞争商家的价格策略.首先得出它们的最优门店价格,然后考虑2商家都开通了团购业务,且团购具有广告宣传效应,得出了2商家的最优团购价格,并形成Nash均衡.证明了2商家的最优团购价格是顾客转移比例的增函数,是团购广告效应因子的减函数.最优团购价格也受到团购网站收取的佣金比例的影响,但这2者之间的单调性还取决于团购广告效应因子的大小.最后,通过一个算例得出了2商家的最优团购价格以及总利润,并得出开展团购可以提高商家销量,增大利润,也为团购消费者带来了低价和实惠,实现了团购双方的互惠互利. Current literature of group-buying pricing basically considers a single merchant, and usually ignores the influence of the advertising effect on pricing decision. This paper studies the pricing decision for duopoly group-buying merchants with a fixed pricing mechanism. First, we obtain the optimal store prices of both mer-chants. And then both merchants conduct the group-buying business. Considering the advertising effect of the group-buying, the optimal group-buying prices of both merchants are obtained, and generate Nash equilibrium. We prove the optimal group-buying prices of both merchants are increasing functions of the customer transfer ra-tio ,and decreasing functions of advertising effect factor. The optimal group-buying price is also a function of the commission ratio charged by the group buying website, however, the monotonicity of the function depends on the advertising effect factor. At last, an example shows the optimal store prices, the optimal group-buying prices and the profits for the duopoly, and the conclusion follows that adopting group-buying business can increase de-mand and profit for the merchants, and can bring lower price for the customers, and realize a mutual benefit for both the merchants and the customers.
出处 《广州大学学报(自然科学版)》 CAS 2017年第3期87-95,共9页 Journal of Guangzhou University:Natural Science Edition
基金 广东省自然科学基金自由申请资助项目(2016A030313535) 2014年度广州市属高校科研资助项目(1201431002)
关键词 定价 团购 双寡头竞争 广告效应 pricing group-buying duopoly advertising effect
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