摘要
针对政府补贴和制造商减排投入之间的矛盾,本文构建了政府不补贴制造商(NS情景)、补贴制造商减排投入(IS情景)以及补贴制造商生产产量(QS情景)下三阶段政府与双寡头制造商的博弈模型,探讨制造商的生产产量和减排投入策略,并比较不同补贴情景下制造商利润和社会总福利的差异。研究发现,政府补贴能有效地提高制造商利润和社会总福利,投入补贴策略下的最优补贴率与技术溢出率呈正相关性关系,产量补贴策略下的最优补贴率与技术溢出率呈"U"型关系,而无论何种补贴策略最优补贴率均与产品差异性呈负相关性。上述结论为政府补贴政策提供理论依据,也为企业减排投入提供对策思路。
Aiming at the contradiction between government subsidy and manufacturer emission reduction investment, the paper builds game model of government and duopoly manufacturers under three scenarios ： the manufacturers without sub- sidies （Scenario NS）, subsidy to emission reduction investment （Scenario IS） and subsidy to the quantity （Scenario QS） , to discuss manufacturers＇ quantity and investment strategies and compare the differences between profits and social welfare in different subsidy scenarios. The research finds that government subsidies could improve both manufacturers＇ profit and social welfare effectively, the optimal subsidy-rate under IS scenario is positively related to technology spillo- vers, while they show a U-shaped relationship under QS scenario, but optimal subsidy rate is negatively related to prod- uct differentiation under any subsidy strategy. The above conclusions provide the theoretical basis for the government sub- sidy policy, and also provide the countermeasures for the enterprises to emission reduction investment.
出处
《商业研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2017年第6期34-42,共9页
Commercial Research
基金
国家自然科学基金项目
项目编号:71373157
71403120
江苏高校哲学社会科学重点项目
项目编号:2015ZDIXM039
上海海事大学研究生创新项目
项目编号:2016ycx074
上海海事大学优秀博士论文培育项目
项目编号:2016BXLP005
关键词
双寡头市场
最优策略
政府补贴
减排投入
duopolistic market
optimal strategy
government subsidy
emission reduction investment
