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中国自然保护区生态补偿机制构建与反思--基于各方利益主体的博弈视角 被引量:8

Construction and Reflection of Ecological Compensation Mechanism of Nature Reserve: Based on Game Analysis of Interests of All Parties
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摘要 在分析生态补偿机制中各方利益主体决策行为的基础上,构建了中国自然保护区生态补偿政策下两组核心利益主体的博弈模型,研究了相关利益主体行为的"可信性问题"和相关因素变动对主体行为的影响。结果表明:"不可信许诺"使得生态补偿政策难以达到预期效益,要使社区居民遵守"诺言",取决于查处概率和处罚金额两方面因素;在现实生活中,由于"激励悖论"现象的存在,增加对企业的罚款从长远来看并不能真正抑制企业的污染行为,反而会增加当地保护区管理部门懈怠渎职的概率。因此,提出中国自然保护区生态补偿机制的重构路径:以健全官员考核体系,加大惩处力度为基础;以加强宣传教育,提高居民收入为纽带;以完善法律制度,创新监管机制为动力;以明确责任主体,疏通信息渠道为保障。 Background The construction of nature reserve is an important guarantee for maintaining regional ecological balance and practicing green development.Ecological compensation mechanism plays an important role in processing the external problems of ecological products in nature reserves.At present,there are many problems in ecological compensation mechanism of nature reserve carrying out like as the supporting measures are not perfect,the compensation object behavior is difficult to be constrained,the interest targets are different between compensation subjects and objects,etc.So it is necessary to reflect on the ecological compensation mechanism of nature reserves in China.Methods Based on analyzing the decision-making behavior of interests of all parties in ecological compensation mechanism,this paper constructed the game model of two groups of core interests under the ecological compensation policy of the nature reserve in China.At first,the game between the management of protected areas and community residents was discussed.Then the behavior of the management department and enterprise in he ecological compensation mechanism was analyzed.In addition,combining with the reality of the situation,this study reflected the incentive paradox in the ecological compensation policy of the nature reserve in China.Results Through the game analysis of 3 party interests,this paper obtained 2 analysis results:Firstly,in the game between the management of protected areas and community residents,no credible promise makes the ecological compensation policy difficult to achieve the expected benefits.In the case of reasonable compensation to the residents of the community,it will help to achieve the harmony development between community residents and protected areas through 3 measures as increasing the supervision of community residents and the amount of punishment,improving the community residents awareness of environmental protection and reducing the opportunity cost of community residents.Beyond that,the behavior choice of commun
作者 王君 李锦宏
出处 《林业经济问题》 北大核心 2017年第2期39-44,共6页 Issues of Forestry Economics
关键词 自然保护区 生态补偿 博弈 nature reserve ecological compensation game theory
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