摘要
本文关注监理双重角色和开发商主动披露信息自发需求不足的问题,并从信息经济学的角度,对监理市场的供求进行分析。指出监理质量提高的关键是提高P或收窄P1>P>P2的区域,即与开发商是否利用信息不对称盈利有关;各种监管力度无法充分反映建筑物最终用户的需求时,P只可能在P2附近摆动,监理市场帕累托改进就无法实现。
This paper analyzes the demand and supply of supervision to the construction projects, viewing it as one of the information disclosure sectors from a perspective of information economics. It shows under what kinds of condition in the market the dual roles of the supervisors are separated or united. It also shows under what kinds of condition in the market the building suppliers have deficient or sufficient demands for the supervisors. This paper gives key points in the governmental control and the solutions to the existing problems in the construction field as well as in all the information disclosure sectors.
出处
《福建师范大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》
北大核心
2005年第4期25-28,共4页
Journal of Fujian Normal University:Philosophy and Social Sciences Edition
关键词
工程监理
信息披露
自发需求不足
激励悖论
supervision to construction projects, information disclosure, deficiency in innerdemands, incentive paradox
