摘要
以中国沪、深两市主板披露的研发投资上市公司为研究对象,基于终极产权论视角,研究终极股东超额控制如何影响公司研发投资以及上述影响在不同产权性质公司间的差异。结果表明:终极股东超额控制程度越高,代理问题越严重,就越倾向于减少高风险、长周期性质的研发投资,终极股东超额控制程度与公司研发投资显著负相关。与非国有控股公司相比,国有控股公司终极股东超额控制程度对公司研发投资的负向影响较小。
Using a corporate-level da tase t of Chinese listed companies disclosing the R＆D information, based on the per -spective of ultimate ownership,this paper studies the impact of ultimate shareholder excess control on corporate R＆D in-vestment and the difference of that impact between companies about different types of ownership property. The results show that： the higher the ex tent of ul timate shareholder excess control , the more serious of the agency problems , and the lower level of R＆D investment. Ultimate shareholder excess control is negatively associated with corporate R＆D invest-ment. Compared with non-state owned companies, the negative impact of ultimate shareholder excess control on corporate R＆D investment in state owned companies is relatively smaller.
出处
《科技进步与对策》
CSSCI
北大核心
2017年第6期91-96,共6页
Science & Technology Progress and Policy
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(71402141)
教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金(14YJC790103)
中国博士后科学基金项目(2015M582705
2016T90943)
关键词
终极股东
超额控制
产权性质
研发投资
Ult imate Sha reholder
Excess Control
Property Rights
R＆D Investment
