摘要
央行能否正确分配救助的流动性供给直接关系到应对金融危机的成效。本文将银行的系统重要性纳入央行流动性救助决策函数中,将商业银行分为系统重要性银行和非系统重要性银行,应用不完全合约模型分析央行的流动性救助策略,结果表明:相对于非系统重要性银行,中央银行应对系统重要性银行采取较为宽松的紧急贷款标准;政府应当根据流动性短缺规模的不同改变央行由于银行倒闭需承担政治成本的权重。
Whether the central bank allocate the liquidity supply properly will affect financial stability. In this paper,difference of systemic significance of banks is considered into central bank＇s rescue policy. Commercial banks are divided into systemic bank and non-systemic bank. This paper applies the incomplete contracts model to analyze the central bank＇s policy of liquidity support,and finds that compared to non-systemic bank,the central bank should lower standards for systemic bank. Government should change the weight of political cost for central bank according to the size of the liquidity shortage scale.
出处
《经济体制改革》
CSSCI
北大核心
2017年第1期136-143,共8页
Reform of Economic System
基金
国家社会科学基金项目"我国银行业系统流动性风险的防控机制研究"(14BJY190)
中央高校基本科研业务费资助项目"我国证券市场系统流动性风险的防控机制研究"(2015JCRC03)
