摘要
"大而不倒"的问题起始于20世纪美国联邦储蓄保险公司的成立,其实质是由于"大而不倒"金融机构的过度风险承担行为、相互之间的关联性以及巨大的规模而导致的系统性风险,和对政府救助的预期所引发的道德风险之间的矛盾。"大而不倒"问题其实是软预算约束的问题。应对"大而不倒",可从系统性风险、道德风险和政府承诺机制三个角度出发,硬化"大而不倒"机构面临的预算约束。要解决这一问题,必须多种方案同时实施。
The 'too big to fail' problem emerged along with the establishment of the US Federal Deposit Insurance Company in the 20th century.It in essence reflected the contradiction between systematic risks caused by the excessive risk-undertaking behavior of big financial institutions,their interconnections and their huge size and a moral risk triggered by expectations of government bailouts.The 'too big to fail' problem is also the problem of soft budget constraint.Based on the soft budget constraint theory,this paper makes an analysis of the institutional environment of the 'too big to fail' problem and the behaviors of financial institutions and the government and their corresponding outcomes.It also sums up solutions to the 'too big to fail' problem and finally makes an evaluation of their effects before concluding that all these measures should be simultaneously taken to resolve the 'too big to fail' problem.
出处
《国际经济评论》
CSSCI
北大核心
2012年第4期81-92,6-7,共12页
International Economic Review
