摘要
作为农村电商市场主体的小微企业,信用缺乏问题为这一市场的可持续发展埋下隐患,探讨适合小微企业特征的信用评级方法成为促进农村电商市场发展的当务之急。借助有限博弈理论比较各类农村电商市场主体信用评级收费模式的优劣,证明农村征信平台采取面向咨询方的收费模式要比面向企业方的收费模式更能减少咨询企业遭受恶意欺诈的风险,同时提高咨询企业安全意识,加大对欺诈交易的惩处力度,提高征信平台对虚假评级信息的尽职调查比例和甄别能力,都能有效控制咨询企业同恶意企业交易的损失率。
Small enterprise is one of the main body of rural e-commerce market, credit deficiency in these enterprises is a hindrance to the sus- tainable development in the market, and the methods of credit rating which are compatible with small enterprises have become the top priority to promote the development of rural e-commerce market. By means of infinitely repeated game theory, the article compared the advantages and dis- advantages of different types of charge mode of rural e-commerce market players ＇ credit rating. Simulation tests showed the risk of consultant being cheated was lower when rural credit platform charged consultant rather than business. Meanwhile, the losses caused by consultancy firm dealing with dishonest firm would be contained by rising consultants＇ safe consciousness, strengthening investigation and punishment on fraudulent transaction, increasing the proportion of research about false evaluation information, and improving the ability of discriminating false information.
作者
唐浩坤
温涛
邹芳莉
TANG Hao-kun WEN Tao ZOU Fang-li(College of Economics and Management, Southwest University, Chongqing 400716 Credit Management Department, Chongqing Operation Office of People＇ s Bank of China, Chongqing 400011)
出处
《安徽农业科学》
CAS
2017年第1期231-236,共6页
Journal of Anhui Agricultural Sciences
基金
国家社会科学基金重大招标项目(11-ZD047)
教育部高等学校博士学科点专项科研基金资助课题(博导:20130182110025)
中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金(SWU1509106)
中国博士后科学基金面上资助项目(2014M552308)
关键词
农村电商市场
信用评级
收费模式
有限重复博弈
Rural e-commerce market
Credit rating
Fee model
Infinitely repeated game
