摘要
从孟子开始,痛感体验(恻隐、识痛痒)即成为儒家内圣("仁心")外王("仁政")之学中的一个关键词。由孟子以痛感体验指点吾人之本心进至宋明理学以"识痛痒"指点仁心,人己、人物相通之"感通"义与宇宙一体生命的"生生"义得以显豁。在此生生一体的相通之中,天地万物均成了能痛痒之主体。而从笛卡尔为代表的个体主义的立场审视,他者是否像我一样是一能痛痒者,我又为何应该关心他者之痛痒乃属于一近乎无解"他人的心"之哲学难题,休谟与斯密乃至当今的现象学家多是诉诸"类推"与"想象"机制解释人己相通之现象。而叔本华则认定这一难题是理性无法解决的,并认为惟一有效的解释只能是"伦理学形而上学",这跟传统儒家以人与天地万物一气贯通来解释疾痛之切体路数颇为相近。而镜像神经元的发现则为这一路数提供了某种生理与心理机制上的支持,但是理解他人情感、感受的"同感"与带有关爱动机的"同情"之间的区别与联系能否在镜像神经元层面上得到有效的解释,至今还是一个问题。
The sensation of pain is one key word of Confucian humanity. In Confucian doctrine of forming one Body with Heaven, Earth and the myriad things, all creatures including plants, animals and humans are related to us in a communion of sentient subjects. Whereas the pain of others is one of the most difficult problems in western Cartesian individualism, Hume, Adam Smith and contemporary phenomenologists usually deal it from the perspective of the so-called inference by analogy and imagination. Schopenhauer points that it cannot be really solved by rational analysis and the ethical metaphysics is the only way of explanation, which is similar to traditional Confucian way of explanation of by the vital energy （qi） encompassing all modalities of being. The discovering of the mirror neuron in 1990s provides some psychological and physiological supports for this approach of ethical or moral metaphysics. But how to distinguish between empathy and sympathy in mirror neuron is still a problem till now.
出处
《社会科学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2016年第12期110-120,共11页
Journal of Social Sciences
关键词
恻隐之心
识痛痒
仁
疼痛镜像神经元
同感与同情
Compassion
Sensation of Pain
Humanity
Pain Mirror Neurons
Empathy and Sympathy
