摘要
考虑当零售商进行提升顾客价值的创新投资时,供应商的协同对零售商创新投资、双方企业利润以及系统福利的影响,探讨信息技术带来的创新投资系数的变化对以上变量的影响。研究表明:当创新投资系数较低时,即顾客价值创新较难时,供应商的协同能够激励零售商加大创新投资,提升顾客价值,缓解"投资套牢"问题;当创新投资系数上升到一定程度时,顾客价值的提升将更容易给供应商带来更高收益。供应商会提供低于承诺价格的批发价格,此时零售商会加大创新投资,提升顾客价值,进而双方企业利润得到进一步提高。另外,供应商对零售商创新投资协同的意愿越弱,承诺批发价格的协议就越脆弱,越容易随着创新投资系数的上升而失效。
Considering a supply chain with an upstream supplier and a downstream retailer who in- vests in innovation to improve customer value, this study examines the impact of supplier＇s coordina- tion on the innovation investment, profit and system＇s benefit. It is confirmed that the ceiling whole- sale price contract can partly coordinate supply chain decisions including the innovation investment, when the improvement of customer＇s value is relatively hard-the innovation investment coefficient is low. And when the innovation investment coefficient is high enough, as customer value contributes more profit to supplier, supplier provides a lower the wholesale price than the ceiling price. In this sit- uation, the retailer makes more investment on customer value, and the profit rises up. Then, the weaker supplier＇s willing of coordination is, the easier ceiling wholesale price contract is invalid be- cause of the change of innovation investment coefficient.
出处
《管理学报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2016年第10期1557-1562,1578,共7页
Chinese Journal of Management
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71172091)
中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助项目(CZY15001)
