摘要
民间金融的政策变化与属性争议使如何对其进行法律治理成为难题。我国目前主要以非法集资法律制度作为对民间金融的法律规制手段。然而非法集资法律制度秉承的金融抑制政策导向和机构监管逻辑使其存在一定的滞后性;这种滞后性使地方政府产生对其进行选择性执法的动力,从而在民间金融的规制上与中央政府构成博弈,导致非法集资法律制度规制失灵,并出现对民间金融的监管空白。只有通过功能监管改革,将所有具有系统性风险的民间金融活动(无论合法与否)都纳入类型化的金融监管体系之中,才能有效避免监管空白,防止区域性金融风险的累积。此外,在一个更长的时间内,还应当拓宽金融市场准入,并明确地方金融监管权,以实现市场均衡和规制均衡,彻底解决我国的民间金融问题。
The changing policy and dispute on the attributes of informal finance cause difficulty in the legal governance of informal finance. As the main legal regulation method of informal finance currently, the legal system of illegal fund-raising has its backwardness stemmed from the financial repression policy and the logic of institutional regulation, which leads to the regulation game between the central government and local governments. As a result of the regulation game, the illegal fund-raising regulation fails, and there exist regulatory gaps. Only though the functional regulation reform could all the informal finance （whether legal or not） be covered by the typed financial regulation system to avoid regulatory gaps and the accumulation of the regional financial risk. In a longer term, the financial service market access should be widen and the financial regulation authority of the local governments should be be explicitly stipulated, so as to achieve market equilibrium and regulation equilibrium and to thoroughly solve the informal finance problem of our country.
出处
《金融监管研究》
2016年第8期75-95,共21页
Financial Regulation Research
关键词
民间金融
非法集资
系统性风险
功能监管
Informal Finance
Illegal Fund-raising
Systemic risk
Functional Regulation
