摘要
在许多国家,公共利益都是反竞争经营者集中赖以通过主管机构竞争审查的重要辩护理由,具体辩护路径有两条:一是视公共利益为集中的效率体现,通过效率抗辩实现公共利益辩护;二是将公共利益作为效率之外的直接豁免因素,效率抗辩是竞争评估的组成部分,竞争评估的结论是集中应予禁止时,再考虑公共利益豁免。由于公共利益与效率抗辩制度存在内在冲突,我国不应采行第一种做法,而宜将公共利益直接作为一种豁免因素。然而公共利益豁免本质上是一种"政策之治",极易成为纯粹的政治干预工具,特别是可能引致主管机构非理性行使豁免裁量权,因此应从明确公共利益事项范围、健全公共利益认定的程序机制、设定利益衡量的基点准则、建立豁免权的分立体制方面建构公共利益豁免制度体系。
In many countries, public interest is an important defense reason for anticompetitive concentration of undertakings being approved by antitrust authorities. Generally, there are two specific defense paths： one regards the public interest as the efficiency coming from concentrations, and puts the public interest into the efficiency defense system; the other one directly takes public interest as an exempt factor besides efficiency. In the latter path, the efficiency defense is part of the competitive assessment. When the conclusion of the competitive assessment is that the concentration should be prohibited, antitrust authorities shall consider the public interest exemption. In China, due to the inner conflicts between the public interest and the efficiency defense system, we had better take public interest as a direct exempt factor. However, public interest exemp- tion is one kind of ＂policy governance＂ in essence, which can easily become a purely political intervention instrument, especially it may cause the authorities to exercise the discretional exempt power irrationally. There- fore, we should establish the legal system of public interest exemption, such as limiting the scope of public interests items, improving the procedural mechanism of identifying public interest, establishing the separation system of discretional exempt power and so on.
出处
《政法论坛》
CSSCI
北大核心
2016年第5期124-135,共12页
Tribune of Political Science and Law
基金
教育部规划基金项目"反垄断法实施中的竞争政策与产业政策协调问题研究"(批准号:09YJA820094)的成果之一
关键词
反竞争经营者集中
公共利益豁免
效率抗辩
路径选择
制度建构
Anticompetitive Concentration of Undertakings
Defense of Public Interest
Efficiency Defense
Path Choice
System Construction
