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盈余管理能否帮助公司摆脱融资约束困境 被引量:12

Can Earnings Management Help Firms Out of Financial Constraints?
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摘要 本文利用2007—2014年我国A股上市公司数据,考察了融资约束背景下公司的盈余管理行为及其对公司外部融资的影响,并进一步分组检验了约束型公司与非约束型公司的投资额和经营业绩。实证分析发现,拥有投资机会但面临融资约束困境的公司会进行显著向上的盈余管理,验证了融资约束动机下盈余管理的存在;而且盈余管理确实传递了"好消息",减少了信息不对称、帮助公司取得更多外部融资摆脱困境,这种关系在非融资约束组的公司中则不成立。分组结果发现,约束组公司的投资额和业绩均高于非约束组。本研究有别于盈余管理经济后果的同质性假设,证明了信息传递型盈余管理的存在。 As a way of managers's moothing discretionary accruals, whether the use of earnings management impacts company positively or not is contigent on the decision context. Using the A- share listed companies over the period of 2007--2014 as research sample, this paper investigates the use of earnings management when firms are faced with financial constraints and its impact on exter nal financing. In addition, we examine the investment and performance of those financially con- strainted firms compared to their unconstrained counterparts, and find that constrained firms with good investment opportunities have significantly higher discretionary accruals, which confirms the existence of informational earnings management(IEM). Informational earnings management delivers good news to outside investors, therefore decreasing information asymmetry as well as helping firms obtain external capital. However, these results are not found in unconstrained firms group. We also provide evidence that constrained firms invest more and perform better. This paper is different from prior study that set homogeneous hypothesis for earnings management which show us positive side.
出处 《现代财经(天津财经大学学报)》 CSSCI 北大核心 2016年第8期79-90,共12页 Modern Finance and Economics:Journal of Tianjin University of Finance and Economics
基金 国家自然科学基金项目(71172067) 天津市教委重大项目(2014ZD52)
关键词 盈余管理 融资约束 外部融资 信息不对称 earnings management financial constraints external financing information asymmetry
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