摘要
对2008年沪深两市A股上市公司的实证研究发现,企业所得税的实际税率和税收监管在管理层考虑投资成本、监管风险等情况下抑制了过度投资,而税负在管理层合理避税动机下反而刺激了过度投资。结合上市公司股权控制特征,对实际控制人股权性质的分组检验表明,所得税对国有控股公司比非国有控股公司在过度投资行为上的影响更为显著。
Based on the implementation of new Income Taxation Law, this paper studies how executive tax rate, tax supervision and tax burden impact on firms' over-investments extensively occurred in China. Evidence from A-share shows that executive tax rate and tax supervision restrain the over-investments when investment cost and supervision risk are considered, while tax burden stimulates the over-investments for ra- tional tax avoidance. In addition, the test of subsample of shareholding shows that income taxation has more significant influence on over-investments in state-owned firms than in non-state-owned firms.
出处
《财贸研究》
CSSCI
2011年第1期119-126,共8页
Finance and Trade Research
基金
国家自然科学基金项目"公允价值计量下应计盈余质量及其决策有用性研究"(批准号:70972131)
中国人民大学科学研究基金项目(研究品牌计划)(10XNI010)资助
关键词
实际税率
税收监管
税负
自由现金流
过度投资
executive tax rate
tax supervision: tax burden- free cash flow: over.investment