摘要
项目制的实施对中央与地方行为产生的影响正成为学术研究的一个焦点,但是对这种影响产生的内在机制尚缺乏充分的讨论。本文借鉴信息经济学和组织社会学的理论视角,以农业综合开发项目中的资金配套作为切入点,分析了项目运作中中央政府与地方政府的互动。研究发现,实行分税制前后,配套机制的功能由"筹资"转向"甄别—激励";在分税制实施后的项目运作过程中,资金配套成为中央转移支付时重要的信息甄别、控制权分配与激励设置的机制。围绕信息传递、激励设置,中央与地方进行了"控制"与"反控制"的博弈,从而使得制度的设置偏离了原有的预期。
The impact of the project system on both the central and the local governments is becoming a focus of attention in academic research. However,the internal mechanism that causes the impact has gone largely untouched. By adopting the theoretical perspectives of information economics and organizational sociology,this paper starts with the funding support of comprehensive agricultural development projects and analyzes how the central and the local governments interact in the project operation. It is found that the mechanism of funding support changes from'fund- raising'to'screening and incentive- setting'around the period of the tax reform.After the tax reform,funding support becomes an important means for the central government to conduct information screening,control rights distribution and incentive settings when it is making fund transfer. Surrounding information transmission and incentive settings,the central and the local government are playing a'con-trol'and'counter-control'game. As a result,the system is deviating from the original expectation.
出处
《开放时代》
CSSCI
北大核心
2016年第5期113-129,共17页
Open Times
基金
“农村社会治理中的基层政府行为研究”(项目编号:151090)的阶段性成果,该课题得到霍英东教育基金会的资助
关键词
项目制
配套机制
信息甄别
控制权
激励设置
project system
funding support mechanism
information screening
control rights
incentive settings
