摘要
从地方政府竞争视角将环境规制"逐底竞争"行为内生化,进而剖析"污染避难所"假说的根源。结果表明:政府降低环境规制水平显著增加本地区的高耗能产业流入,证实了"污染避难所"假说;地方政府间环境政策博弈使得互相之间模仿行为显著;地方政府存在竞相降低环境规制标准以吸引高耗能产业投资的现象,即"逐底竞争"和"污染避难所"假说同时成立。
This paper tries to make the ＇race-to-the-bottom＇behavior of environmental regulation endogenous and analyze the reasons of pollution haven＂from the perspective of local government competition. The results show that, government reducing the level of environmental regulation can significantly increase the inflow of high energy consuming industries, it verifies the existence of ＂pol- lution haven＂; there are significant imitation behaviors between local governments on making environmental policy based on game; lo- cal governments are competing to reduce the standard of environmental regulation to attract high energy consuming industries invest- ment, namely ＂race-to-the-bottom＂ and ＂pollution haven＂ hypothesis are both confirmed.
出处
《山西财经大学学报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2016年第8期46-54,共9页
Journal of Shanxi University of Finance and Economics
基金
国家社会科学基金项目(14CJY079)
国家社会科学基金重大项目(15ZDB163)
教育部人文社科基金项目(13YJC790151)
江苏省社会科学基金项目(12EYB007)
中国博士后基金项目(2013M531420)
关键词
政府竞争
环境规制
高耗能产业
逐底竞争
污染避难所
government competition
environmental regulation
high energy consuming industries
race-to-the-bottom
pollution haven
