摘要
本文利用Matlab详细模拟分析了三寡头古诺市场上各种成本不对称情形下资产剥离的合意性,得到如下结论:(1)在厂商技术相同而资产不同的情形下,兼并厂商总是具有兼并动机,且在行业技术特别先进的条件下,兼并将产生单边效应,而资产剥离措施无效;(2)在技术不同而资产相同的情形下,向在位竞争者剥离资产是无效的,而向潜在进入者剥离资产的有效性取决于兼并可获得的效率改进类型及潜在进入者的技术水平;(3)在技术和资产均不对称的情形下,向潜在进入者剥离资产虽可以消除兼并导致的协调效应且不至于引发单边效应,但前提是潜在进入者的技术水平需高于行业最低水平。可见,在不对称情形下,资产剥离措施能否有效关键在于是否可以找到一个技术较为先进、有能力且有意愿成为相关市场上活跃的、有竞争实力的潜在进入者。这提醒反垄断当局需谨慎使用这一结构性补救措施。
Although asset divestiture has been widely applied in horizontal mergers as an effective remedy,it is unclear what is the necessary condition for the effectiveness of asset divestiture under cost asymmetry. In this paper,we analyze the effectiveness of asset divestiture under three type cost asymmetry,and conclude that：（1）If the technology asymmetry alone,mergering participant always have sufficient incentive to merger,while the horizontal merger will have a unilateral effect under the condition of special advanced industry technology,and the asset divestiture fail;（2）If the property symmetry alone,it is unuseful to transfer asset to competitor,and the effectiveness to divest asset to entrants depends on the type of efficiency obtained by mergered entity and the technology level of entrants;（3）In the case of the technology and assets are both asymmetric,divest assets to entrant could not eliminate the coordinated effect stemmed from horizontal merger,unless the technology level of entrant is higher than the lowest industry level. In a word,whether the asset divestiture is effective in asymmetric circumstances depends on if we can find a entrant with advanced technology,so that it has the ability and willingness to become an active competitor in relevant market. It implicates that the antitrust authorities need to be careful to use the structural remedies.
出处
《南开经济研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2016年第3期21-51,共31页
Nankai Economic Studies
基金
国家社科基金青年项目"博弈视角下横向兼并的反竞争效应及反垄断规制研究"(12CJY049)
中国博士后基金面上项目(2011M500644)
天津市教委重大项目(2012ZD)
黑龙江省高校青年学术骨干支持计划项目(1254G029)资助
关键词
成本不对称
资产剥离
横向兼并
单边效应
协调效应
消费者福利标准
Cost Asymmetry
Asset Divestitures
Horizontal Merger
Unilateral Effects
Coordinated Effects
Consumer Welfare Standard
