摘要
本文从福利经济学角度出发,研究了跨国保险集团利用子公司所在国监管制度和资本成本的差异,通过内部再保险业务进行监管资本套利的问题。研究表明,跨国保险集团的监管资本套利行为,可以实现节约监管资本、降低资本成本的套利目的,但却对保单持有人福利造成重大损失。理论分析和数据检验均表明,监管资本要求充分考虑违约风险因素,可以有效保护保单持有人福利免受监管资本套利行为的损害。
From the perspective of welfare economics,the article studies the issue how multinational insurance groups achieve the regulatory capital arbitrage through the internal reinsurance business by making use of the differences in the regulatory system and capital costs in the country where the subsidiaries are located.The research shows that the regulatory capital arbitrage behavior of multinational insurance groups can save the regulatory capital and reduce the capital cost,but cause heavy welfare loss to the policyholders.Both theoretical analysis and data test show that regulatory capital requires to fully consider the default risk,thus can effectively protect the policyholders' benefits from being damaged by regulato-ry capital arbitrage.
出处
《上海金融》
CSSCI
北大核心
2014年第2期57-62,117,共6页
Shanghai Finance
基金
国家自然科学基金青年项目(项目批准号:71303169)
教育部人文社会科学研究基金青年项目(项目批准号:13YJC790120)阶段性研究成果之一
关键词
跨国保险集团
监管资本套利
保单持有人福利
条件尾部期望
在险价值
Multinational Insurance Groups
Regulatory Capital Arbitrage
Policyholders' Welfare
Conditional Tail Expectation
Value at Risk
