摘要
运用2006—2013年中国A股上市公司的数据,考察了产品市场竞争下董事长与总经理两职合一对公司绩效的影响及其作用机理。结果表明:随着产品市场竞争的加剧,两职合一对公司绩效有显著的正向影响;产品市场竞争通过约束管理层的行为减少委托代理问题的发生,且两职合一的信息优势和沟通效率促进了公司业绩的提升。因此,在复杂多变的外部环境中董事长与总经理两职合一更有利于公司经营。
Using the data of China＇s A-share listed companies from 2006 to 2013,this paper studies the effect of CEO duality on firm′s performance in competitive environment and its impact mechanism.The results show as follows：with the enhancing of product market competition level,CEO duality improves firm′s performance;product market competition relieves the agency problem by constraining managers′self-dealing behaviors,and the information advantage and communication efficiency of CEO duality make managers to response rapidly and,then positively impact firm′s performance.Therefore,CEO duality is a better choice for companies in competitive environment.
出处
《技术经济》
CSSCI
北大核心
2016年第5期124-131,共8页
Journal of Technology Economics
关键词
产品市场竞争
两职合一
公司绩效
product market competition
CEO duality
firm′s performance
