摘要
研究生选择学术失范还是学术守范,是一个不断进行矛盾构建的过程,是利益相关者之间展开的一场博弈。本文分析了研究生与高校之间进行博弈的基本要素及相关参数,分别从完全理性假设、有限理性假设出发,探讨了研究生学术失范行为的分析模型,分析了研究生、高校的支付函数与收益情况。研究表明,收益的大小是影响研究生选择学术守范或失范行为的一个关键因素;当学术失范行为的收益一定时,加大惩罚力度,提升其支付成本,对减少学术失范行为具有显著影响;减少学术失范行为的查处成本,扩大查处概率,能够有效控制研究生学术失范。这些结论丰富了学术失范行为的理论研究体系,也为治理研究生学术失范行为提供了有益参考。
That graduates abide by academic rules or destruct them is not only an ongoing process of conflict and construction but also a game between stakeholders. This paper analyzes the essential elements and related parameters of the game. It constructs the analytical model about graduates＇ academics based on the bounded rationality hypothesis and the perfect rationality hypothesis,discussing the graduates＇ academic dishonesty,graduates＇ and universities＇ utility functions and benefits. The results show that（ 1） the magnitude of income plays a key role in graduates＇ choice of abiding by or destructing academic rules;（ 2） when academic dishonesty brings out a certain income,universities should increase punishment and cost of academic abnormality to reduce dishonesty; and（ 3） reducing cost and increasing the probability of investigation is an effective way to prevent academic dishonesty. These results have not only deepened and broadened the theory of academic dishonesty,but also provided helpful references for dealing with academic dishonesty.
出处
《科研管理》
CSSCI
北大核心
2016年第4期136-142,共7页
Science Research Management
基金
2014年度教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目(项目批准号:14YJC880002
起止时间:2014.7-2017.7)
2013年度国家自然科学青年基金项目(项目批准号:61305087
起止时间:2013.9-2016.9)
关键词
博弈理论
研究生
学术失范
支付
完全理性
有限理性
game theory
graduate
academic dishonesty
payoff
perfect rationality
bounded rationality
