摘要
在中央政府如何应对权威体制与有效治理之间悖论的问题上,既有理论提出三种应对机制,即逐级代理制、政治教化礼仪化和运动型治理机制,但在海洋环境管理领域,对于条块联合执法这一化解治理悖论的主要手段,三种机制都欠缺充分解释力。因此,文章基于多案例分析,从信息调节、集分权调节与治理有效性调节三个维度对条块联合执法的行为逻辑进行了阐释。文章认为中央部门通过媒体输出联合执法信息,是对地方的预先警示;在执法过程中,提升治理有效性的方式是整合地方力量共同面向高风险性项目,与此同时,地方信息的输入成为中央部门对联合执法时机和领导部门进行动态调整的依据,进而可以在实质意义上调整集分权平衡;在收尾环节,条块部门之间的信息互动使得治理有效性的动态平衡得以维持。通过分析,文章提出治理悖论的应对机制还包括央地共治型管理机制,是对既有理论的一个补充。
On the question of how Chinese central government deals with the paradox between authority system and effective governance,existing theories propose three coping mechanisms which are the gradual agency system,the etiquette of political education and the campaign style governance. However,in the field of marine environmental management,the joint law enforcement between central departments and local governments behaves as the main way to resolve this governance paradox,which could hardly be explained by the three coping mechanisms. Thus,the objective of this article is to illustrate the logic of central-local joint law enforcement. An exploratory multi-case study,involving 74 joint law enforcement cases,was conducted,and information regulation,centralization-decentralization regulation and governance effectiveness regulation are the main analysis dimensions. The article reveals that before central-local joint law enforcement,the central departments usually warn the local governments by outputting law enforcement information through the media. In the course of law enforcement,the way to improve the effectiveness of governance is integrating local power to deal with high risk projects. Meanwhile,the input of local information becomes the basis for the central authorities to adjust the timing of the joint law enforcement and the leading department,thus to adjust the balance between centralization and decentralization. In the ending stage,the information interaction between central departments and local governments maintains the dynamic balance of governance effectiveness. The key limitation of the study is that,the widespread use of central-local co-governance mechanism in the field of marine environmental management is due to the cross regional and multi-objective attribute of ocean management.Therefore,the replication ability is restricted by the special objective attribute of the management object. This management mechanism is suitable for the public service areas of which the ruling risk spillover range is wider,s
出处
《公共管理学报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2016年第2期49-62,155,共14页
Journal of Public Management
基金
国家社会科学基金青年项目(15CZZ020)
中国博士后科学基金(2015M582147)
关键词
央地关系
治理悖论
海洋管理
联合执法
Central-local Relationship
Governance Paradox
Marine Management
Joint Law Enforcement
