摘要
地方政府的政绩诉求是影响财政补贴行为的重要因素之一。本文以2008年至2012年中国A股上市公司数据,考察了地方政府政绩诉求与财政补贴方式之间的关系。研究结果表明,地方政府政绩考核压力越大,财政补贴水平越高。此外,进一步研究发现地方政府会选择不同的补贴方式,具体而言,相比于研发补贴等经济总量贡献小、时效性差的补贴方式,地方政府更偏好于进行税收补贴和出口补贴。这意味着地方政府在政绩诉求下,会通过财政补贴等手段把宏观考核目标传递到企业微观层面。
Political achievement appeals of local government are important factors affecting financial subsidies behavior. Using a sample of Chinese A-share listed companies from 2008 to 2012, this paper examines the relationships between political achievement appeals of local government and financial subsidies modes. We find that： 1. when the political achievement ap- peals of local government are greater, the preference for financial subsidies is stronger; 2. local government chooses different subsidies modes selectively. Compared with some subsidies modes which make a small contribution to economic aggregate and have weak timeliness, such as research and development subsidies, local governments prefer tax subsidies and export subsi- dies. This paper suggests that the local government with political achievement appeals deliveries macroscopic assessment objec- tives to the microscopic level through fiscal subsidies.
出处
《中国经济问题》
CSSCI
北大核心
2016年第2期16-28,共13页
China Economic Studies
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(71372206、71302185)
教育部人文社科规划项目(14XJA630002)
西南财经大学中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金(JBK1507148)的资助
关键词
政绩诉求
政府补贴
补贴方式
achievement appeals
government subsidies
subsidy modes
