摘要
转基因食品作为一种特殊的食品,直接关系到公众的健康和安全。对于转基因食品监管问题,政府的不同部门、企业公司、专家学者、非政府组织以及普通消费者都有着不同的利益诉求和观点。本文从监管者、监管对象、监管过程等三个方面全面梳理我国转基因食品监管体制特征和问题,并运用监管政策的成本-收益分析框架,对我国转基因食品领域的研发者、种植者、消费者以及政府部门等不同利益主体成本收益的集中分散情况进行深入分析,最后借鉴美国政治学家詹姆斯·威尔逊的监管政治理论,提出中国转基因食品监管政策制定过程的发展目标应当超越美式的利益集团政治,逐步走向公开博弈的利益相关方政策参与机制。
As a special kind of food,the application of genetically modified food（GMF）is fundamentally important for public health and safety.Different stakeholders,such as government agencies,food companies,scholars and experts,NGOs and consumers,have their own distinctive interest concerns in the policy process of GMF regulation.This paper employs a cost-benefit analytic framework to explore the concentrating degree of its policy cost and benefit among various actors,summarizing the features and problems of China＇s current GMF regulatory regime from the dimensions of regulator,regulatee and regulatory process.Finally,by employing the regulatory politics theory by American political scientist James.Q.Wilson,it proposes that the developmental object of China＇s regulatory politics on GMF should be beyond US-style interest group politics and switch to a more transparent and equal bargaining game among all different stakeholders.
出处
《华中师范大学学报（人文社会科学版）》
CSSCI
北大核心
2016年第2期1-7,共7页
Journal of Central China Normal University:Humanities and Social Sciences
基金
国家自然科学基金项目"基于RIA分析框架下的中国食品安全监管体系评估及优化研究"(71573264)
北京高等学校青年英才计划
关键词
转基因食品
食品安全
监管体制
监管政治
genetically modified food
food safety government regulation
regulatory politics
