摘要
目前我国农村集体经营性建设用地流转大多仍被限制,但流转的需求真实存在,流转行为私下时有发生。为探究农村集体经营性建设用地流转的驱动因素,考量农民这一流转主体的权益,本文运用博弈论,建立静态博弈模型,研究村集体与政府之间的博弈、农民与村集体和政府之间的博弈。研究发现,受到各方利益驱使,在村集体与政府之间的博弈、农民与村集体和政府之间的博弈中,村集体、农民的最优行动策略是对农村集体经营性建设用地选择流转。从理论上解释了农村集体经营性建设用地流转的经济合理性。
At present, most of China’s rural collective management construction land transfer is still limited, but the demand of transfer really exists, the behavior of transfer occurs in private occasionally. In order to explore the driving factors of rural collective management construction land transfer and consider the interests of farmers, this paper used game theory to con-struct static game models and analyzed the game between village collective and the government, the game between farmers and village collective, the government. The results showed that： driven by their interests, in the game between village collec-tive and the government, the game between farmers and village collective, the government, the village collective and farm-ers’ optimal operation strategy was to choose the transfer of rural collective management construction land. This explained the economic rationality of rural collective management construction land transfer in theory.
出处
《湖北农业科学》
2015年第24期6397-6400,共4页
Hubei Agricultural Sciences
基金
河北省社会科学发展研究民生调研专项课题(201501101)
保定市哲学社会科学规划课题(201505018)
关键词
集体经营性建设用地
流转驱动力
静态博弈
collective management construction land
driving force of transfer
static game
