摘要
我国目前对农村集体建设用地的使用权大多采取限制其流转的政策,但生活中仍有大量集体建设用地流转行为发生。本文通过博弈的视角,建立静态博弈模型对村集体、建设用地转入方及政府三者的行为选择进行分析,阐述农村建设用地流转行为产生的过程。最终得出村集体与政府的博弈中的最优策略是选择流转;转入方理性的行为策略是向农村集体转入建设用地;允许集体建设用地流转是政府的理性选择的结论。从理论上解释了虽然我国法律禁止农村集体建设用地入市流转,但是实践中仍有大量集体建设用地发生流转的现象。
At present, as to the rights of using rural collective construction land, our country in most cases adopts pohcy of limiting its transfer, however, the phenomenon of the transfer of collective construction land still occur in life. From the perspective of game theory, this paper established static game models to conduct analysis on the behavior choices of the village collective, construction land transferee and the government and elaborated the rise of transfer behavior in rural construction land. The final finding concluded that the optimal strategy in the game between the village collective and the government is to choose transference; the transferee＇s rational behavioral strategy is to transfer construction land to rural collective; and allowing the transfer of collective construction land is the conclusion of the govemment＇s rational choice. It theoretically explains the phenomenon that although the laws in our country prohibit the market transference of the rural collective construction land, in practice there is a large amount of such transference.
出处
《山东农业大学学报（自然科学版）》
CSCD
北大核心
2013年第4期556-561,共6页
Journal of Shandong Agricultural University：Natural Science Edition
基金
国家"十一五"支撑计划(2008BAB38B02-1)研究成果
关键词
农村建设用地
土地流转
静态博弈
Rural collective construction land
land transference
static game
