摘要
基于Nooteboom模型构建网络中企业间创新合作的博弈模型,确定企业合作伙伴数的临界值,结合复杂网络模型仿真企业网络的动态演化,研究企业网络结构与合作度的变化规律。结果表明,企业合作的临界伙伴数由合作收益、成本及风险决定。当企业合作伙伴数小于临界值时,合作是最优策略,且随着合作度增加,合作网络的特征路径长度缩短,集聚度下降网络出现均匀而致密的结构;在合作的伙伴数等于临界值时,网络中的合作度最大,结构趋于稳定。
This paper proposed an innovation cooperation game model in the enterprises networks based on the modified Nooteboom model. We analyzed the risk dominant equilibrium of the game model and obtained the threshold of the partner number in the enterprises networks. Furthermore,we simulated the evolutionary dynamic of the enterprises innovation cooperation networks and learned the rules of their topology properties based on the theory of complex network. The results indicated that the thresholds of the partner number in the enterprises networks depended on the benefits,costs and risks of innovation cooperation. When the number of enterprises＇ partners is smaller than the threshold,the cooperation rates will increase,the characteristic path lengths will shorten and the cluster degrees will decrease. When the number of enterprises＇ partners is equal to the threshold,the cooperation rates will reach the maximum and approach to stability. When the number of enterprises＇ partners is larger than the threshold,the cooperation rate will decrease.
出处
《科技管理研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2016年第3期171-175,共5页
Science and Technology Management Research
基金
国家自然科学基金面上项目"基于超网络的企业多主体合作创新与创新群体演化研究"(71373198)
教育部人文社科基金青年项目"利益博弈视角下体育公共服务供给的路径优化研究"(15JYC890035)
中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金项目"企业群落空间演化的区域经济增长极形成机理及路径选择"(2015VI004)
武汉体育学院青年教师科研基金项目"基于博弈论的政府购买公共体育服务的路径选择"(2015QS06)
关键词
合作
创新
企业网络
合作伙伴
innovation
cooperation
enterprise network
partner
