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基于连带责任的供应商集群内机会主义行为治理研究——一种网络治理模式 被引量:16

Research on Governance of Opportunistic Behaviors in Cluster of Suppliers Based on Joint Liability: A Mode of Network Governance
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摘要 在供应链合作关系中,核心企业应采取何种治理模式对供应商集群内的机会主义行为进行有效控制这一问题日益受到关注。网络治理研究现已成为供应链合作关系治理研究领域的重点,但已有相关文献仍未脱离以垂直二元关系为研究焦点的窠臼。本文在横向网络关系层面探讨一种极具针对性的网络治理模式——连带责任治理对供应商集群内机会主义行为的抑制作用,并检验横向监督在其中的中介效应。研究结论是:供应商之间的连带责任对其机会主义行为具有显著的抑制作用;横向监督在供应商之间的连带责任对其机会主义行为的影响中起到完全中介作用。 Along with the increasing importance of supply chain management, cooperative relationship between the focal enterprise and its cluster of suppliers becomes more and more widespread. However, suppliers' inherent opportunistic tendency is also serious, which affect directly the focal enterprise's product quality manage- ment. Therefore, attention has been increasingly paid to the topic that which mode of governance should be adopted by the focal en- terprise to control effectively opportunistic behaviors in cluster of suppliers in the cooperative supply chain. Network governance has been highlighted in the research field of governance of supply chain partnership. However, the existing literature still doesn't break away from focusing on the vertical dyadic relationship. Based on horizontal network relationships, this study explores the joint liabil- ity governance which is a specific mode of network governance. Its inhibiting effect on opportunistic behaviors in cluster of suppliers and the mediating effect of peer monitoring have been examined. The research results are as follows: joint liability among suppliers has inhibiting effect on their opportunistic behaviors; the effect of joint liability among suppliers on their opportunistic behaviors is mediated completely by peer monitoring. This study makes several contributions to the literature. First, the existing literature analyzes the focal enterprise's negative strategy adopted to cope with the influence of its embedded social network, but doesn't explore how the focal enterprise use initiatively the horizontal network relationship to govern suppliers' opportunistic behaviors, let alone put forward strongly operational mode of network governance. Therefore, this study takes the joint liability governance as the core object of anal- ysis, which enriches network governance literature. Second, the present related literature focuses on the dyadic relationship between the focal enterprise and its supply chain partners. The analysis unit of this study i
出处 《南开管理评论》 CSSCI 北大核心 2016年第1期97-107,共11页 Nankai Business Review
基金 国家自然科学基金项目(71172209 71572131)资助
关键词 供应商集群 网络治理 连带责任 横向监督 机会主义行为 Cluster of Suppliers Network Governance Joint Liability Peer Monitoring Opportunistic Behaviors
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