摘要
考虑实施CDM(Clean Development Mechanism)低碳项目的生产型垄断企业与政府的单阶段斯坦克尔伯格博弈。其中政府为领导者,以碳税税率为决策变量,企业为跟随者,以低碳产品价格及CDM项目期内总的碳排放量为决策变量。政府以社会福利最大化为目标,制定碳税税率时考虑了企业不同税率范围下的最优碳排放策略。企业面对市场上不同低碳偏好的消费者,以利润最大化为目标,首先制定其低碳产品的最优价格,然后根据不同碳税范围制定相应的周期总排放量。分析表明,低碳产品的定价受消费者低碳产品认知度与碳税税率等因素的影响;碳排放量方面,相对不同的碳税水平,存在最低、最高及凹函数稳定点解。根据这三类排放策略分析了政府最优碳税取值范围并结合算例分析得出了一些建设性的结论。
A single-period Stackelberg game between a monopolistic manufacturer that is going to implement the CDM project and the government is considered. In order to control the carbon emission, the government as the leader has to decide the carbon tax rate. Accordingly, the company as the follower needs to optimally determine the total emission quantity during the project cycle. Before that, the company with the profit maximization objective needs to decide the price of its low-carbon product when facing different customer＇ s low-carbon preferences. Then, based on different scenarios of the taxation level, the company decides the emission over the project cycle. The analysis shows that, the pricing level is affected by the tax rate as well as the low-carbon preference. For the emission, according to different tax levels, there exist the lowest, highest margin solutions and the stable point solution. The analysis is theoretically addressed on behalf of the optimal solutions against different taxation levels, and some decision-making suggestions are presented by the numerical study.
出处
《运筹与管理》
CSSCI
CSCD
北大核心
2015年第6期261-271,共11页
Operations Research and Management Science
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71171205)
华南农业大学校长科学基金
新学科扶持基金
关键词
低碳
CDM
碳税
碳排放
碳交易
low-carbon
CDM
carbon tax
carbon emission
carbon trading
