摘要
自2008年世界金融危机以来,我国企业负债率水平节节攀升,无论是国有企业还是非国有企业,都逐步走向高负债。但是高负债是否就是过度负债?国有与非国有企业相比较,谁更过度负债?本文从企业过度负债角度而非实际负债率角度检验了企业产权性质与过度负债间的关系。研究发现相较于非国有企业,国有企业资产负债率高于长期目标资产负债率的程度和可能性更低,说明从长期及动态角度看,国有企业过度负债程度和可能性更低;但是,国有企业利息覆盖率过低的可能性更高,说明从短期及静态角度看,国有企业更可能存在债务违约风险,过度负债的可能性更高。进一步研究表明,企业动态角度下的过度负债(过度资产负债率)与静态角度下的过度负债(过低利息覆盖率)具有一致性,但是国有企业性质削弱了二者间的正相关关系,说明国有企业性质为企业的动态负债风险提供了隐性担保。在考虑股权分置改革、IPO暂停及内生性问题后,本文结果未受影响。
Chinese companies＇ leverage has risen up since 2008 financial crisis, but does high leverage mean excessed leverage？ And whose leverage is more likely excessed between SOEs and Non-SOEs？ This paper examines the relationship between state ownership and excess leverage, rather than the relationship between state ownership and leverage itself. Results show that compared to Non-SOEs, SOEs leverage are more likely to be higher than the long term leverage target, which suggests that SOEs are more likely to have excess leverage from the long run and dynamic aspect. But SOEs are also more likely to have a lower interest coverage ratio, which suggests that SOEs＇ leverage is more likely to be excessed from the short term or static aspect. Further tests show that firms＇ excess leverage situation is consistent from dynamic aspect and static aspect, but state ownership weakens this relationship, suggesting that state ownership provide implicit guarantee for SOEs dynamic leverage risk.
出处
《经济研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2015年第12期54-67,共14页
Economic Research Journal
基金
国家自然科学基金重点项目(项目批准号:71132004)
财政部"会计名家培养工程"(财政部财会[2013]27号文)对本文的资助
