摘要
以2013—2020年我国沪深A股非金融类上市公司为研究样本,考察董责险治理对企业激进投融资行为的影响,发现:引入董责险治理会诱发企业进行超额融资和过度并购等激进投融资行为。进一步地,董责险治理诱发的超额融资、过度并购等激进投融资行为会阻碍企业“脱虚向实”。吸引保险机构投资者、合理设置赔偿限额以及交易所监管问询可以防范董责险治理诱发的激进投融资行为。本文的研究不仅可以丰富董责险治理经济后果以及企业激进投融资行为影响因素的文献,而且可以为董责险治理机制的实践应用提供一些经验证据。
Taking A-share non-financial listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2013 to 2020 as research samples,this paper tested the impact of Directors’and Officer’Liability Insurance(hereinafter referred to as D&O Insurance)on radical investment and financing behaviors of enterprises,it could be found that:the introduction of D&O Insurance would induce enterprise to carry out radical investment and financing behaviors such as excessive financing and excessive merge and acquisition.Furthermore,the radical investment and financing behaviors induced by D&O Insurance would hinder enterprise from"Industrialization and Definancialization".The introduction of insurance institutional investors,reasonable setting compensation limit and Stock Exchange supervision inquiry could prevent radical investment and financing behaviors.This paper could not only enrich the literature on the economic consequences of D&O Insurance and the factors influencing the radical investment and financing behaviors of enterprises,but also provide some empirical evidences for the practical application of the D&O Insurance.
作者
曹玉珊
张十根
Yushan Cao;Shigen zhang
出处
《会计与控制评论》
2022年第1期221-247,共27页
Review of Accounting and Control
基金
江西省高校人文社会科学研究项目(GL18130)
江西省2019年度研究生创新专项基金项目(YC2019-B078)
关键词
激进投融资行为
董责险治理
超额融资
过度并购
radical investment and financing behaviors
directors’and officers’liability insurance
excessive financing
excessive merge and acquisition
