摘要
论文基于拉闸限电的政策背景,从理论上提出了激励错配下,官员特征影响政府规制行为扭曲的内在机理,并借助于相关数据进行检验。研究表明,拉闸限电并非一般的简单粗暴型行政行为,而是激励错配下,政治官员片面追求晋升利益的扭曲行为。具体而言,年龄越长、晋升概率越小的官员越倾向于短视政策,但政治风险承担较低的特性会使此类行为发生的频率降低。本地官员由于需要回报当地特定的利益集团,往往更倾向于采取这种有偏政策;但是,较长的任期可以引致官员的理性发展,可以有效降低短视行为发生频率。以上因素导致政策执行出现区域分化的个体特征,这表明,纠正当前政府扭曲行为不仅需要提升环境激励,更须侧重官员个体差异。此外,即使考虑到政治更替的潜在冲击,论文的研究结论依旧稳健。
This paper examines theoretically proposed incentive mismatch wihtin the policy context of electrical power cuts. Relevant data regarding officials own characterizations of the internal mechanisms that impact of government distortions to regulatory behavior. Studies show that simple power cuts is not an ordinary,administrative method but rather results from incentive mismatch and the promotion of the distortive interests of political officials. Specifically,the longer officials are allowed to remain at their posts,the smaller the probability of promoting officials more inclined to short- sighted policies. But low political risk characteristics make this rather infrequent. Local officials,who often have a need to help a specific interest group,tend to be more inclined to make a biased policy. Longer terms may lead to the rational development of officials as well as the effective reduction of short- sighted behavior. All of the above leads to the individual characteristics of the implementation of regional differentiation of the policy. This indicates that the government,in order to correct distortions,not only needs to improve environmental incentives but more officials must focus on individual differences. Even taking into account the potential impact of political turnover,the conclusions of this paper are still robust.
出处
《公共行政评论》
CSSCI
北大核心
2015年第6期59-82,186-187,共24页
Journal of Public Administration
基金
教育部人文社会科学基金青年项目“中国式分权下的地方政府质量提升路径研究”(12CJL022)
关键词
拉闸限电
地方政府
攫取行为
官员个体特征
Power Cuts
Local Governments
Grab Behavior
Officials Individual Characteristics
