摘要
新股询价制度第二阶段改革允许承销商自主推荐机构投资者参与询价,冀图通过引入推荐类询价机构,为新股正确定价,解决IPO"三高"问题。本文利用2010年10月新股询价制度第二阶段改革到2012年底询价机构在中小板、创业板的询价数据,实证研究推荐类询价机构在IPO询价配售中的行为。研究发现,推荐类机构作为承销商的"托",为承销商承销的IPO,特别是询价机构较少的低抑价IPO提供友情报价,导致新股高价发行。被承销商累计推荐次数越多,友情报价问题越严重;并且存在只参与某个承销商承销的IPO询价的"御用询价机构"。这与改革意图相违背。但券商声誉机制有助于克服友情报价问题。
The underwriters, as decided in the second-stage book-building reform, are allowed to recommend institutions in the inquiry. By introducing recommended institutions, it is aimed to price the newly issued stocks properly to address the issue of ＂three highs＂ for IPO. Based on the micro quote and purchase data of SMEs and GEMs board during the period from Oct 2010, the period of the second- stage inquiry reform, to the end of 2012, this paper studies the recommended institutions＇ behavior in the IPO inquiry. We find that the recommended institutions are more likely to offer ＂friendship quotes＂ for the IPOs underwritten by the underwriters who recommend them, especially for those of low-grade. This raises the issue price for the new stocks. We also find that the more times recommended by the underwriters, the more likely for the participants to offer ＂friendship quotes＂. What＇s worse, there are ＂imperial institutions＂ who will only make inquiries for a certain underwriter. Obviously, it goes against to the object of the reform. However, the reputation mechanism of underwriters is contributable to the elimination of friendship quote problems.
出处
《经济评论》
CSSCI
北大核心
2015年第6期144-158,共15页
Economic Review
基金
国家社科基金项目"基金家族利益输送问题研究"(项目编号:14FJL002)
广东省自科基金项目"基金管理结构对投资行为
激励机制的影响机理及效应研究"(项目编号:2014A030313372)
广东省学科建设项目"开放式基金管理结构与经理激励效应研究"(项目编号:2013WYXM0013)
广州市哲学社会科学"十二五"规划项目"基于互联网金融的广州小微企业融资模式创新研究"(项目编号:15G21)的阶段性成果
关键词
IPO
推荐类询价机构
友情报价
IPO, Recommended Book-building Institution, Friendship Quote
