摘要
2014年1月的新股网下发行过程中,承销商通过设定有效报价区间从而自主决定新股配售对象。本文以参加网下申购的投资者为样本,研究了承销商通过自主配售进而相互交换利益的行为。研究发现承销商将新股配售给另一家承销商的关联投资者,作为交换,另一家承销商也将新股配售给该承销商的关联投资者。进一步研究表明,承销商事前将有效报价区间提示给意欲关照的投资者,帮助其取得获配新股的资格。这些发现扩展了对于承销商利用自主配售权牟取私利的认识,有助于证券监管部门进一步完善相关规则、维护市场公平公正。
In the off-line issuance process of new shares in January 2014,underwriters can determine which investors receive allocations of new issues by setting the range of bidding prices for valid bids.Using a sample of institutional investors participating the off-line issuance process,the paper studies the discretionary allocation behavior of underwriters in new issues offering.We find that if an underwriter allocates new shares to investors affiliated to another underwriter,and the latter underwriter allocates,in return,new shares to investors affiliated to the former underwriter.Further analysis indicates that underwriters leak,in advance,the valid range of bidding prices to investors who enjoy preferential treatments for allocation of new issues so as to help them to obtain qualification for allocations.These findings deepen our understanding of the exchange of interests between underwriters through discretionary allocations,and are useful for securities regulatory agencies to formulate rules that safeguard fairness and justice in the capital markets in China.
作者
郑琦
Qi Zheng(School of Economics and Management,Changsha University of Science and Technology,Changsha,Hunan,China 410114)
出处
《当代会计评论》
2021年第3期56-74,共19页
Contemporary Accounting Review
基金
国家社会科学基金项目“‘多链融合’背景下产业政策精准支持企业创新研究”(20BJL133)的资助
关键词
自主配售
首次公开发行
承销商
利益交换
discretionary allocation
IPOs
underwriter
exchange of interests.
