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基于公司治理视角的家族上市公司避税研究 被引量:9

Research on Tax Avoidance of Family Listed Companies Based on Corporate Governance
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摘要 首先分析家族控股股东避税决策的成本收益,尤其关注因代理问题带来的非税成本,接着从公司治理的两个维度——所有权结构和董事会结构来寻找影响家族企业避税行为的因素,结果表明:控制权与现金流权的分离度与避税程度显著正相关,说明两权分离度越高避税问题越严重;长期机构持股与避税程度显著负相关,说明稳定的机构持股能够有效发挥对控股股东的监督作用,使得避税程度得以减轻;两职合一与避税程度呈显著正相关,说明两职合一不利于权力制约,使得避税问题更加严重;股权分散度、董事会规模及独立董事比例均在统计上不显著。 On the basis of analyzing the cost and benefit of family controlling shareholder's decision on tax avoidance and especiaUy focusing on non-tax cost brought by agency problem, this paper makes a research on factors affecting family hsted companies'tax avoidance behavior from two dimensions of corporate governance, namely : ownership structure and board structure. The study finds that: the separation degree of control rights and cash flow rights is positively related to the degree of tax avoidance, which states the higher separation degree of the two rights, the more serious the tax avoidance. Long-term mechanism ownership has significantly negative relation with tax avoidance, which indicates a stable institutional investors can supervise the controlling shareholders effectively and the degree of tax avoidance is thus lower. The combination of chairman of the board and CEO has a significantly positive relation with tax avoidance, which indicates that the combination of two duties is not in favor of rights restriction and tax avoidance is even serious. The equity dispersion degree, board size and the proportion of independent directors are not significant in statistics.
作者 颜淑姬
出处 《南京审计学院学报》 2015年第5期69-76,共8页 journal of nanjing audit university
基金 国家自然科学基金项目(71302032)
关键词 家族上市公司 代理成本 公司治理 企业避税程度 机构持股 现金流权 股权分散度 family listed company agent cost corporate governance tax avoidance in company institutional ownership cash flow rights equity dispersion
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参考文献23

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