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金融业与产业发展匹配程度的实证研究 被引量:9

Empirical Analysis the Matching Degree between Financial and Industry Development
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摘要 产业发展离不开金融的支持,也必将带动金融业的进一步发展。使用灰色关联分析与耦合度分析方法,建立了合肥市金融业与产业协调发展评价指标体系,并对合肥市金融业与产业发展匹配程度进行了实证研究。实证结果表明:金融业对产业的耦合作用强于产业对金融业的耦合作用;合肥市金融业与产业在1999~2012年间的发展匹配度较高,但在“十二五”初期金融业与产业两个系统的协调度有所下降。 Industry development cannot leave the financial support, and will drive the further development of the financial sector. This article used grey relational analysis and coupling analysis method, established the evalua- tion index system of finance and industry coordinated development in Hefei, and did empirical research on the matching degree of industry and financial sector development in Hefei. The empirical results show that: the finan- cial sector' s coupling effects on industry is stronger than the coupling effects on financial sector; matching degree of financial sector and industry in Hefei in 1999 -2012 is higher, but the coordination degree of the two systems decreased in the early 12th five -year.
出处 《经济问题》 CSSCI 北大核心 2015年第9期63-68,共6页 On Economic Problems
基金 国家自然科学基金项目(71403001) 教育厅人文社科重点项目(SK2013A011) 安徽省软科学项目(1302053044) 中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金(2011HGRJ0006)
关键词 金融业发展 产业发展 灰色关联模型 耦合度模型 development of financial development of industry Grey Relational Model Coupling Mode
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