摘要
本文通过建立竞争博弈模型,分析竞争环境下企业对XBRL技术的采纳动机与采纳效率,探讨企业的最优XBRL采纳时机以及政府的最优辅助策略,并进一步分析政府行为对XBRL技术扩散的影响作用。研究发现:(1)企业是否采纳XBRL技术以及何时采纳与其竞争特性有一定的相关性,并受到其他企业决策的影响;(2)根据企业博弈结果,政府能够确定最优辅助策略;(3)发挥政府的干预作用,可以提升企业的竞争特性,促进XBRL技术扩散。最后,本文还对XBRL事业在中国的推进提出了一些具体建议。
By establishing a game- theoretic model,this paper analyzes the companies' adoption incentive and efficiency of XBRL technology under competition,determines the companies' optimal XBRL adoption time and the government's optimal support strategy,and then further discusses the effects of government behavior on technology diffusion. The results show that firstly whether the company would adopt XBRL and the time of choosing to adopt is relevant with its competition character,and is also influenced by the other company's adoption strategy. Secondly,the optimal support strategy could be determined based on the analysis of enterprise competition game. Thirdly making full use of the role of government intervention could improve the companies' competition character and promote XBRL diffusion. Finally,the paper gives concrete suggestions about the advancement of XBRL business in China.
出处
《会计研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2015年第8期19-23,96,共5页
Accounting Research
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(71502102
71372104)
中国博士后科学基金项目(2014M560321)的资助
