摘要
运用两阶段斯塔克伯格博弈模型研究了XBRL在利益相关者之间的扩散问题,分析了XBRL技术标准的采用对主体企业和利益相关者交易价格、交易量、市场份额以及利润的影响。结果表明:当部分利益相关者采用XBRL时,主体企业的总交易量变大;对采用者来说,交易价格变高,交易量变大,市场份额增大,当采用者数量较少时利润减少,而当采用者数量足够多时利润增加;对未采用者来说,交易价格变低,交易量变小,市场份额缩小,利润总额降低。对主体企业来说,部分采用而不是所有利益相关者都采用XBRL技术标准才是最佳结果,也就是存在最优的采用者数量使得主体企业在XBRL技术扩散中获得最大利润。
This paper studies the XBRL standardization diffusion among the stakeholders based on Stackelberg model.We analyze the adoption effects of XBRL on the main firm＇s as well as its stakeholders＇ transaction prices,trading volumes,market shares and profit.The results show that when there are part of stakeholders adopting XBRL,more trading volumes of the main firm will be realized.Transactions price,trading volume and market share of adopters will increase.When the number of early adopters is less,the profit of adopters will decrease;however when the number of adopters is large enough,the profit will increase.In contrast,the transactions price,trading volume,market share and profit will decrease for the stakeholders who did not adopt XBRL.An interesting outcome we found is that a partial adoption by the stakeholder base is optimal for the main firm.That is,there are an optimal number of adopters for the mail firm to obtain the maximization of profit.
出处
《管理学报》
CSSCI
2011年第2期273-277,283,共6页
Chinese Journal of Management
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(70672075)
国家社会科学基金资助项目(06BJY019)
关键词
XBRL
信息标准
利益相关者
斯塔克伯格博弈
均衡
extensible business reporting language
information standardization
stakeholders
Stackelberg game
equilibrium
