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基于纳什议价的对等网络资源分配 被引量:6

Nash bargaining based resource allocation in peer-to-peer network
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摘要 针对对等(P2P)网络中普遍存在的自由下载问题,提出保证节点最小服务质量的一种基于纳什议价的资源分配方案。首先,建立保证节点最小服务质量的理论模型,分析表明合作博弈的节点议价权力与其最大贡献能力正相关,非合作博弈节点的议价权力与其最大贡献能力负相关,因此,合作节点比非合作节点获得更多的资源;其次,证明了合作博弈中节点的相对议价权力越大,节点获得的资源越多,收益越大,反之亦然。最后,通过仿真验证系统保证节点获得最小服务质量的前提下,合作节点获得的资源与节点的初始资源分配和纳什议价权力等因素相关;初始资源分配与节点的最大贡献能力呈正相关,并随着节点数目的增加而减少;议价权力随着节点数目的增加而下降,节点获得的资源随着节点议价权力的增加而增加。该方案与经典保证公平性的平均资源分配方案相比,合作节点能获得更多的资源。仿真结果验证了理论分析中在保证节点服务质量前提下,节点议价权力越大,获得的资源越多。 To effectively overcome the free-rider problem existing in Peer-to-Peer (P2P) network, this paper presented resource allocation scheme based on Nash bargaining which guarantees the minimum Quality of Service ( QoS). Firstly, the article built the system model of the minimum QoS, analysis indicated that the cooperative peer' bargaining power is positively related to the maximum cor^tribution ability but the non-cooperative peer' bargaining power is negative related to the maximum contribution ability, so, the cooperative peers can obtain more resources than non-cooperative peers; secondly, the article demonstrated that the cooperative peer who has larger relative bargaining power could obtain more resources than the others. Lastly, simulations show that to guarantee the peers receiving the minimum QoS, the cooperation peers resource allocation related to the initial resource allocation and the Nash bargaining power and other factors; the initial resource allocation is positively related to the maximum contribute ability of the cooperation peers, which reduces when the number of peers increases; the bargaining power decreases when the number of peers increases and resource allocation increases when the bargaining power increases. This resource allocation mechanism was compared with the classical average resource allocation mechanism which also guarantees the fairness, the cooperators can obtain more resources. The simulation results verified that the greater the bargaining power of nodes, the more resources to obtain within the minimum QoS.
出处 《计算机应用》 CSCD 北大核心 2015年第9期2424-2429,共6页 journal of Computer Applications
基金 国家自然科学基金资助项目(61001084)
关键词 对等网络 自由下载问题 博弈论 资源分配 纳什议价 Peer-to-Peer (P2P) network free-rider problem game theory resource allocation Nash bargaining
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