摘要
政府担保在金融危机期间如何影响储户的挤兑行为,对该问题的回答有助于我们从储户行为的视角认识政府担保在维护金融稳定中的作用。1935年的"白银风潮"作为中国近代史上的一次金融危机,为研究上述问题提供了绝佳的自然实验。文章利用总行设在上海的银行1932-1935年的资产负债表数据,实证检验了"白银风潮"期间政府担保对储户行为的影响。结果表明:政府担保显著降低了银行遭遇储户挤兑的概率,并且促使银行吸引更多存款流入;储户从不受政府担保的银行提取存款转而存入受到政府担保的银行,由此引起的存款再分配效应避免了整个银行体系的崩溃。文章还发现,具有政府担保的银行在危机期间投放了更多信贷,这对经济的复苏起到了推动作用。文章对于我国的金融安全网从隐性政府担保向显性存款保险制度的转型具有启示。
The answer to the question about the effect of government guarantees on bank run during the financial crisis helps us to understand the role of government guarantees in the maintenance of financial stability from the perspective of savers behavior. The silver panic of 1935 as a financial crisis in modern Chinese history provides an excellent natural experiment for the issue abovementioned. Based on the balance-sheet data of banks headquartered in Shanghai from 1932 to 1935, this paper empirically tests the impact of government guarantees during the silver panic on the behavior of depositors. It arrives at the empirical results that government guarantees significantly reduce the probability of bank run and encourage banks to attract more deposits inflows; depositors withdraw their deposits from banks without government guarantees and redeposit into banks with govern- ment guarantees, and resulting deposit redistribution effect avoids the collapse of the entire banking system. It also finds that the banks with government guarantees during the crisis generate more credit which contributes to the economic recovery. This paper also has a sense of enlightenment to China＇s transition of financial security network from implicit government guarantees to explicit deposit insurance system.
出处
《财经研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2015年第8期105-117,共13页
Journal of Finance and Economics
基金
教育部人文社会科学青年基金项目(11YJC790144)
关键词
金融危机
政府担保
银行挤兑
白银风潮
financial crisis
government guarantee
bank run
silver panic
