摘要
海德格尔对胡塞尔的现象学构想进行了批判,他认为胡塞尔的现象学在意识的基础上决定了意向性的存在,而对意向性"存在规定"的理解是本体论的缺失,这种观点基于对意向性错误的"客观化"和"主观化",因此在限定意向性存在模式和意义的反思性方法时,胡塞尔纯粹现象学具有必然缺陷,并无力质询意向(Intentio)所包含的对存在的先验理解。海德格尔认为,纯粹现象学对存在问题忽略的终极历史根源在于希腊人对存在作为实存意义上的理解,在这个理解上,柏拉图和亚里士多德是不可调和的,而胡塞尔的意向性概念不能被看作是对柏拉图逻各斯提诺斯洞见的重新发现。但是,海德格尔对于柏拉图的批判预设了,柏拉图的苏格拉底式对诸艾多斯看法的说明就是柏拉图就这个主题最后的定论,这也就意味着,海德格尔对胡塞尔意向性概念的存在论/本体论批判是依赖于希腊本体论限制中的历史优先性的。
Martin Heidegger criticizes Husserl＇s formulation of phenomenology and claims that Husserl＇s phenomenology determines the Being of intentionality on the basis of consciousness. On Heidegger＇s view, this understanding of the＂ determination of the Being＂（ Seinsbestimmungen） of intentionality is ontologically deficient, the views based erroneous＂ objectivizing＂and＂ subjectivizing＂of intentionality, that the pure phenomenology have the necessary inablilty when determine the mode and meaning of being of intentionality and have the ability to interrogate the Apriori understanding of being included the intenio. Heidegger thinks that the ultimate historical origin of pure phenmenology＇s neglect of the being question is the Greek understanding of the meaning of being as presence, on this point, it is impossible to harmonize Husserl＇s and Aristotle＇s accounts of Eidê, and Husserl＇s concept of intentionality can not be viewed as the rediscovery of Plato＇s insight into Logos Tinos. But, Heidegger＇s critique of Plato presupposes that Plato＇s Socratic account of the seeing of the eidê is Plato＇s last word on the subject. And this means that Heidegger＇s ontico-ontological critique of Husserl＇s concept of intentionality depend on its historical precedence in the limits of Greek ontology.
出处
《辽宁大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》
2015年第4期58-67,共10页
Journal of Liaoning University(Philosophy and Social Sciences Edition)
