摘要
随着控制性股东向其所控制的上市公司注入专用性资产，在上市公司与控制性股东之间产生了绑定效应，绑定效应使二者在专用性投资的契约期内相互协作并继而影响公司价值。以深、沪两市2010年-2013年的上市公司为样本，研究公司治理机制对专用性投资绑定效应的影响，结果发现：控制性股东的专用性投资绑定效应通过对其行为的影响，能够对上市公司的市场价值产生积极作用；公司治理机制作为一个调节变量，会影响到控制性股东专用性投资对上市公司价值的积极作用；公司治理机制越完善的公司，专用性投资对公司价值的正向作用越显著。
As controlling shareholders of listed companies invest specific assets, a binding effect is gener- ated between the controlling shareholder and the listed company, which makes them mutually cooperative in the contractual period. Maintaining a good contractual relationship will in turn impact corporate value. This paper studies effects of corporate governance mechanism on the binding effect of specific assets with the com- panies listed from 2010 to 2013 as samples. The result shows that the binding effect of controlling shareholders＇ specific assets can bring a positive effect on the corporate value of the listed company by influ- encing their behaviors; the level of corporate governance in the listed company, as a moderator, can impact this relationship; there will be a more positively significant relationship between asset specificity and corpo- rate value with a perfect corporate governance system.
出处
《广东财经大学学报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2015年第4期93-102,共10页
Journal of Guangdong University of Finance & Economics
基金
天津财经大学科研发展基金项目(2014Q140119)
天津市哲学社会科学规划后期资助项目(TJGLHQ1405)
关键词
资产专用性
公司治理
公司价值
控制性股东
绑定效应
asset specificity
corporate governance
corporate value
controlling shareholder
binding effect
