摘要
信息披露是解决信息不对称矛盾、缓解代理冲突的有效手段,其质量的高低受行业竞争性、高管变更等内外部治理因素的影响。分析2009—2013年深市A股上市公司数据,采用深交所信息披露考评结果和盈余管理两个指标作为信息披露质量的代理变量,探讨行业竞争、高管变更及其相互作用对信息披露质量的影响。研究发现:行业竞争对信息披露质量有促进作用;高管变更对信息披露质量产生负面影响;在行业竞争和高管变更的相互作用上行业竞争促进了高管变更对信息披露质量的负面影响,相比低竞争性行业,高竞争性行业公司更容易利用高管更换事件采取机会主义行为,高竞争性行业公司的高管变更导致更低的信息披露质量和更为显著的盈余管理。
Information disclosure is an effective way to resolve contradiction of asymmetric information and ease the agency conflict,the quality of which is influenced by industry competition、top management turnover and other internal or external corporate governance factors. Based on data of A- share listed companies in Shenzhen Stock Exchange from 2009 to2013,Using evaluation results of Shenzhen Stock Exchange and surplus management to measure the quality of information disclosure,this paper investigates the influence of industry competition,top management turnover and their interaction on the information disclosure quality. The results show that the effect on information disclosure quality from industry competition is positive while which from the top management turnover is negative,industry competition enhances the negative effects from executive changes on the information disclosure quality. Compared with lower competitive industries,Companies in high competitive industries are more likely to take advantage of executive changes to take opportunistic behaviors,Top management turnover in higher competitive industries results in a lower information disclosure quality and more significant surplus management.
出处
《贵州财经大学学报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2015年第4期41-50,共10页
Journal of Guizhou University of Finance and Economics
基金
国家自然科学基金项目"我国企业应对反倾销会计信息证据效力保障机制研究"(71272068)
关键词
行业竞争
高管变更
信息披露质量
industry competition
top management turnover
information disclosure Quality
