摘要
研究一个农户和一个批发商组成的二级供应链,围绕同一单质生鲜农产品的消费者需求,在农户和批发商不合作、合作以及使用收益惩罚共享契约三种情形下供应链成员的博弈均衡,分析收益惩罚共享契约对农户安全生产决策和供应链成员利润的促进作用。研究表明:随着供应链一体化程度的提高,其提供安全农产品的可能性增大;只有农产品质量安全对需求量的影响程度和政府惩罚高于一定水平,质量安全成本低于一定水平时,农户和批发商才能达成安全生产收益惩罚共享契约;当农户和批发商达成安全生产收益惩罚共享契约时,若批发商实力绝对大于农户实力,采用共享契约所得的收益增加绝大部分被批发商获得。
Equilibrium is analyzed in the paper from the three different scenarios of noncooperation,coopera-tion and revenue and penalty sharing contract based on a two -stage supply chain between one farmer and one wholesaler with a single and homogeneous fresh agricultural products customer demand.The promotion of revenue and penalty sharing contract to the safety production decisions of the farmer and the profits of the supply chain members is also studied.The results show that the possibility of providing safe agricultural products will increase by improving the integration of the supply chain and when the degrees of the influence of agricultural product safe-ty to demand and the government penalty above a certain level and the degree of safety cost below a certain level, the farmer will choose safe production decision if the revenue and penalty sharing contract can be reached.In ad-dition,if the farmer and wholesaler reach sharing contract producing safe agricultural products and wholesaler strength is greater than the farmer absolutely,the wholesaler would obtain most of the increased profit.
出处
《昆明理工大学学报（社会科学版）》
2015年第2期53-60,共8页
Journal of Kunming University of Science and Technology(Social Sciences)
基金
云南省应用基础研究面上项目"基于CAS的农产品供应链质量安全影响要素涌现研究"(2012FB132)
关键词
农产品
质量安全
共享契约
供应链协调
收益惩罚
agricultural products
quality safety
sharing contract
supply chain coordination
revenue and penalty
