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美国金融制裁运作机制及其启示 被引量:20

An In-depth Analysis of the Operating Mechanism of American Financial Sanctions
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摘要 与传统经济制裁不同,金融制裁具有独特的逻辑基础,它重视聪明制裁理念,强调更有针对性地选择制裁对象;重视发挥市场机制的作用来应对制裁合作与执行难题;高度依赖金融霸权所产生的非均等权力。考虑到当今国际金融体系的性质,金融制裁在很大程度上是美国的一项特权。美国在国内建立了一整套关于金融制裁的法律体系和组织运作制度,并在"9·11"事件之后更加倚重金融制裁的作用,对朝鲜与伊朗的制裁是其中最具代表性的两个例子。本文从理论、制度和实践三个层面简要探讨了美国金融制裁这一研究议程,并分析了其对华影响与我国的应对之策,同时也提出了进一步加强对该项议程研究所要考虑的几个问题。 The logic of financial sanctions is different from that of traditional economicsanctions. As one of the results of the transition of sanctions reform toward smart sanctions or targeted sanctions, current financial sanctions employ the role of the market and individual global financial institutions to solve the cooperation and compliance problems in implementing sanctions, and immensely depend on the asymmetric power resulted from financial hegemony. As the most important sanction-imposing country, the United States has established a complete legal and organizing system to impose, enforce, and carry out financial sanctions. After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, financial sanctions have been given a more significant role in American foreign policy as can be seen in the sanctions against North Korea and Iran. This paper examines the logic, institution, and employment of American financial sanctions and their implications for China. In conclusion, the author argues that more efforts should be taken to explore the cooperation, compliance, and legitimacy of financial sanctions.
作者 刘建伟
出处 《国际展望》 CSSCI 2015年第2期111-126,共16页 Global Review
基金 教育部人文社科青年项目"偏好 模式与实施效果:美欧俄经济制裁方略的比较研究"(项目批准号:13YJCGJW008) 中国财政发展协同创新中心项目"应对重大国家安全挑战的国防财政经济能力建设研究"的阶段性研究成果
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  • 1Daniel W. Drezner, The Sanctions Paradox: Economic Statecraft and International Relations, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999, pp. 10-11. 被引量:1
  • 2Robert A. Pape, "Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work," International Security, Vol. 22, No. 2, 1997, pp. 90-91. 被引量:1
  • 3David Cortrlght and George A. Lopez, et al., The Sanctions Decade: Assessing UN Strategies in the 1990s, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000, pp. 15-17. 被引量:1
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  • 9Robert A. Pape, "Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work," pp. 99-101. 被引量:1
  • 10David Cortright and George A. Lopez, et al., The Sanctions Decade: Assessing UN Strategies in the 1990s, p. 44. 被引量:1

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