摘要
从IPO抑价的视角考察股权制衡机制的有效性,结果发现:单独的股权制衡机制对降低IPO抑价的作用有限,其治理效果有赖于公司所处地区法律保护的强弱,在法律保护好的地区,股权制衡型的公司有着更低的IPO抑价。这表明控制性股东可通过引入其他监督性股权向外界发送自我约束的信号以降低代理成本,而且暗示着良好的法律环境更有助于发挥大股东的监督作用与防止股东合谋的形成。
The effectiveness of power balance with shareholder structure is discussed from the perspective of IPO under-pricing.Evidences show that the negative correlation between power balance with shareholder structure and IPO under-pricing is only significant for listed firms located in the districts of high legal protection, implying that controlling shareholders can introduce other competitive shareholders to send signals of self-restraint to reduce agent cost and that the legal environment might be an important factor behind large shareholders' choice of supervision or collusion.
出处
《汕头大学学报（人文社会科学版）》
2015年第1期57-62,96,共6页
Journal of Shantou University(Humanities and Social Sciences Edition)
基金
教育部人文社科基金项目(13YJC630097
09YJA630090)
广东省哲学社会科学"十二五"规划项目(GD12YGL03)
汕头大学博士科研启动项目(STF10003)
关键词
股权制衡
IPO抑价
法律保护
股东合谋
Power Balance with Shareholder Structure
IPO under-pricing
Legal Protection
Shareholders ' Collusion
