摘要
根据外交解密档案和有关当事人回忆,由于国民强烈的反核感情和战后特殊的国际环境,战后日本的核政策表面上主张"和平利用"核能,倡导"无核三原则",加入《核不扩散条约》,没有公开制造核武器。然而,在和平利用名义下进行的核电开发,实际上从一开始就有明确的军事意图,与追求核武器"制造"能力的军事目的紧密结合,成为一个"核电"与"核武"互为表里的复合型政策体系。在该政策的推行过程中,日本还先后两次与美国签署"核密约",允许美国"运进"核武器,寻求美国的核保护伞,并在依赖美国核保护伞的背后,通过发展核电,行独立保持"制造"核武器潜在能力之实。
Declassified diplomatic files and memoirs suggest that due to the strong domestic anti-nuclear sentiments and unusual international environment,Japan's postwar nuclear policy advocated the 'peaceful use'of nuclear energy,promulgated the three non-nuclear principles,joined the NonProliferation Treaty,and chose not to pursue nuclear weapons. Nevertheless,from the very beginning the development of nuclear power under the name of peaceful use had a clear military dimension and was closely related to the capability of making nuclear weapons. In other words,'nuclear power'and 'nuclear weapons'together constituted the whole of a complex policy system. For example,Japan signed secret nuclear treaties with the U. S. twice,allowing the U. S. to bring in nuclear weapons and seeking the U. S. nuclear umbrella. Through the development of nuclear power,Japan also kept the capability of making nuclear weapons independently.
出处
《国际政治研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2014年第6期25-39,5-6,共15页
The Journal of International Studies
基金
国家社科基金重大招标项目"新编日本史"(13&ZD106)
南开大学中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金项目"转型期日本政党的对外政策与中日关系研究"(NKZXB1108)的部分内容
