摘要
从群体博弈和适应角度,运用演化博弈方法深入研究了PPP模式下的公私双方在保障房建设中的合作机制。以地方政府和私人投资者只具有有限理性为前提,建立了PPP模式下保障房建设公私双方合作的演化博弈模型,并利用复制动态进化机理分析了保障房建设中公私双方合作中的群体博弈局势的变化形态。研究得出,保证常规监督—激励机制的激励约束效果是PPP模式下保障房项目公私双方良性合作机制建立的基础和先决条件;如果常规监督—激励机制效能不足,需要额外检查来补充;当常规和非常规约束机制都失效时,双方的合作必然滑向次劣或最劣均衡导致项目双方及项目本身利益受损,并据此提出了公私双方在保障房PPP项目中达成稳定合作的对策建议。
This paper makes a complete study of the public-private partnerships in indemnificatory housing PPP project construction based on evolutionary game theory. First,given the limited rationality that characterizes both governments and private investors,a public-private coordination evolutionary game model was established. And then the coordination model＇s change,the evolutionary equilibrium and the evolution path are analyzed based on the duplicate dynamics equations. Finally,some constructive advice are provided for building stable win-win cooperation in indemnificatory housing PPP project based on the evolutionary game analysis.
出处
《工程管理学报》
2015年第1期59-64,共6页
Journal of Engineering Management
基金
国家社会科学基金重点项目(12AZD108)
关键词
保障房建设
PPP模式
合作机制
演化博弈
indemnificatory housing
PPP model
coordination mechanism
evolutionary game
